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(1967-1974), passim; A. ZIMMERMANN, Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur Meta-
physik und Physik des Aristoteles aus der Zeit von etwa 1250-1350, Leiden / Köln 1971,
pp. 49-145.
2. On Marsilius’ fame at fifteenth-century Polish and German universities, see
M.J.F.M. HOENEN, Marsilius of Inghen. Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought, Lei-
den / New York / Köln 1993, p. 10. On the spread of Buridan’s ideas in Central Europe
see B. MICHAEL, Johannes Buridan. Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezep-
tion seiner Theorien im Europa des späten Mittelalters, I, Berlin 1985, pp. 334-336, and
WHAT CAN WE KNOW ABOUT GOD?
JOHN BURIDAN AND MARSILIUS OF
INGHEN ON THE INTELLECT’S NATURAL
CAPACITY FOR KNOWING GOD’S ESSENCE
Femke J. KOK
Abstract
Recent investigations into the relationship between the questions on the Meta-
physics authored by Marsilius of Inghen, on the one hand, and John Buridan, on
the other, have revealed interesting doctrinal contrasts between them. The pre-
sent article extends these investigations by examining the metaphysical question
of whether we have a natural capacity for knowing God. Even though Marsilius
followed Buridan’s reasoning to a great extent, he disagreed with his main point:
that our intellect has the natural capacity for abstracting an absolute, simple,
essential concept of God from his effects. The disagreement is rooted in their dif-
fering conceptions of what an absolute concept of God entails, viz. Buridan’s
strictly philosophical conception vis-à-vis Marsilius’ more theological conception.
1. Introduction
Remarkably few commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics are extant
from the fourteenth century1. Two of them have become widely
famous in the following centuries, especially at universities in Central
Europe. These are the commentaries of John Buridan (ca. 1300 –
ca. 1361) and Marsilius of Inghen (ca. 1340-1396)2. Buridan, who
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M. MARKOWSKI, «L’influence de Jean Buridan sur les universités d’Europe Centrale», in:
Z. KALUZA – P. VIGNAUX (eds.), Preuve et raisons à l’Université de Paris. Logique, ontologie
et théologie au XIVe siècle, Paris 1984, pp. 149-163.
3. See L.M. DE RIJK, «The commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics» in: O. WEIJERS
– L. HOLZ (eds.), L’enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe -
XVe siècles), Turnhout 1997, p. 305.
4. See B. MICHAEL, Johannes Buridan, pp. 809-810.
5. Even if Buridan was still alive at the time Marsilius studied in Paris, which cannot
be stated with certainty, it is unlikely, if not impossible, that Marsilius studied under Buri-
dan, given the fact that they belonged to different nationes, the Picard and English-German
nation respectively. See J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN, «The Buridan-School Reassessed. John Buri-
dan and Albert of Saxony» in: Vivarium 42 (2004), p. 23.
6. For a gathering of facts about Marsilius’ life, see M. SCHULZE, «Marsilius of Inghen»,
in: Biographisch-bibliographischen Kirchenlexikon, Vol. 16, Stuttgart 1999, cols. 988-1001.
See also W. COURTENAY, «Marsilius of Inghen as Theologian», in: H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS –
M. HOENEN (eds.), Marsilius of Inghen. Acts of the International Marsilius of Inghen Sym-
posium organized by the Nijmegen Centre for Medieval Studies Nijmegen, 18-20 december
1986, Nijmegen 1992, pp. 39-57.
7. Marsilius taught in Heidelberg from 1386 (the year of the foundation of the studium
of Heidelberg) until 1396 (the year of his death). See M. HOENEN, Marsilius of Inghen,
p. 16. Recently, Andrea Tabarroni put a more exact date to Marsilius’ lectures on the Meta-
physics, based on a passage in quaestio 16 of book 7 («utrum in re singulari sit aliqua
natura universalis distincta contra naturam singularem»), where Marsilius uses the exam-
ple: «Urbanus VI est homo». Tabarroni reasonably claims that the use of such example
points to a period that Urban VI was still alive, that is before October 15th 1389. See
A. TABARRONI, «John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the Meaning of Accidental
Terms (Quaestiones super Metaphysicam, VII 3-5)», in: Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione
filosofica medievale 14 (2003), pp. 402-403, n. 33.
8. See M. HOENEN, Marsilius of Inghen, p. 16. For the relationship between Buridan
and Marsilius see also J. THIJSSEN, «The Buridan-School Reassessed», pp. 18-42, and
A. TABARRONI, «Buridan and Marsilius on Accidental Terms», p. 390.
was an arts master at the university of Paris for all his academic life,
lectured on Aristotle’s Metaphysics at least three times3. The ultima lec-
tura of his questions on the Metaphysics originated from after 1346,
probably circa 1350/13554. Marsilius of Inghen is commonly known
as a student of John Buridan, even though he never formally gradu-
ated under him5. After his graduation as a master of arts in Paris,
Marsilius studied and taught theology at the university of Heidel-
berg6. His commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics originated from the
period of his studies in Heidelberg, probably from between 1387 and
13897.
It is acknowledged by several historians that Marsilius’ questions
on the Metaphysics, like his other commentaries on Aristotle’s work,
follow closely in the footsteps of Buridan’s8. Yet, recent investigations
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9. See M.E. REINA, «Comprehensio veritatis. Una questione di Marsilio di Inghen sulla
Metafisica», in: L. BIANCHI - E. RANDI (eds.), Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento. Studi in
ricordo di Eugenio Randi, Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, pp. 283-335; P.J.J.M. BAKKER,
«Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité des accidents eucharistiques. Observations sur les rap-
ports entre métaphysique et théologie au XIVe siècle», in: Z. KALUZA – J.-L. SOLÈRE (eds.),
La servante et la consolatrice. La philosophie dans ses rapports avec la théologie au Moyen Âge,
Paris 2002, pp. 193-245, and A. TABARRONI, «Buridan and Marsilius on Accidental
Terms», pp. 389-407.
10. In an article about the «comprehensio veritatis», based on the first question of the
second book of both masters, Reina acknowledges a difference in the theological under-
pinning of Buridan’s and Marsilius’ epistemological views. Furthermore, Bakker proves
that Buridan’s and Marsilius’ opinions on the acceptability of theological arguments in
metaphysics drove a wedge between their ideas on the univocity of being. See M.E. REINA,
«Comprehensio veritatis», p. 335, and P. BAKKER, «Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité»,
pp. 213-214. The doctrinal divergence between Buridan and Marsilius on the subject of
accidental terms was not caused by different perspectives concerning the role of theolog-
ical argument in metaphysics. Cf. A. TABARRONI, «Buridan and Marsilius on Accidental
Terms», p. 390.
11. As is well known, arts masters in Buridan’s day had to take a vow that they would
dispute no purely theological questions and that, if they had to dispute a question that
touched upon both faith and philosophy, they would determine it in favour of faith. Buri-
dan reacted to this vow explicitly in his commentary on the Physics, where he wondered
how he was supposed to solve these questions in favour of faith, if he was not allowed to
dispute them. See M.M. MCLAUGHLIN, Intellectual Freedom and its Limitations in the Uni-
versity of Paris in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century, New York 1977, pp. 127-128. See
also E.D. SYLLA, «Ideo quasi mendicare oportet intellectum humanum. The Role of Theol-
ogy in John Buridan’s Natural Philosophy», in: J. THIJSSEN – J. ZUPKO (eds.), The Meta-
physics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan, Leiden / Boston / Köln 2001, pp. 221-222,
and P. BAKKER, «Aristotelian Metaphysics and Eucharistic Theology: John Buridan and
Marsilius of Inghen on the Ontological Status of Accidental Being», in: J. THIJSSEN –
J. ZUPKO, The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy, pp. 247-264.
12. JOHN BURIDAN, Quaestiones super Metaphysicam (hereafter QM), II, 3: «Utrum
cognoscere possimus primam causam, scilicet Deum»; MARSILIUS OF INGHEN, Quaes-
tiones super Metaphysicam (hereafter QM), II, 3: «Utrum cognitio prime cause est homini
into the relationship between the two commentaries show interesting
doctrinal contrasts9. The disagreement between Buridan and Marsil-
ius was more than once caused by different perspectives on the role
of theological argument in metaphysics10. Interestingly, it has been
found to be not the philosopher Buridan, but the theologian Marsil-
ius who preserved a stricter separation between the order of nature and
the order of miracle11.
The relation between Buridan’s and Marsilius’ commentaries on the
Metaphysics has not yet been exhaustively investigated. In this article,
I will compare their views on the human capacity for knowing God
or, in philosophical terms, the first cause12. Because of its theologically
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possibilis», and XII, 13: «Utrum in puro lumine naturali possit esse evidens sive notum
Deum esse». For Buridan’s text, I use the following edition: In Metaphysicen Aristotelis
Quaestiones argutissimae [secundum ultimam lecturam], Paris 1518 (Rpt. [with incorrect
date of original publication of 1588] Frankfurt am Main 1964). L.M. de Rijk has argued
for the reliability of this edition in comparison with several manuscripts. See L.M. DE
RIJK, «The Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics», pp. 303-312. Incidentally, I cor-
rect the edition with MS. Venezia, Biblioteca Marciana, lat. Cl VI, 204a, and MS. Paris,
Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14716. The reliability of these manuscripts is
established by P. BAKKER, in: «Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité», pp. 215-216. Very
recently, L.M. de Rijk provided an edition of what he labels the Lectura Erfordiensis in
I-IV Metaphysicam, which in his view constitutes an early (possibly the earliest) version
of Buridan’s Questions on the Metaphysics: L.M. DE RIJK, Lectura Erfordiensis in I-IV
Metaphysicam together with the 15th-century Abbreviatio Caminensis. Introduction, Crit-
ical Edition and Indexes, Turnhout 2008. Although there are scarcely any doctrinal dif-
ferences between the questions «Utrum nos possimus intelligere primam causam» in the
Lectura Erfordiensis and «Utrum possimus cognoscere primam causam, scilicet Deum»
in the ultima lectura, some parts in the ultima lectura are missing in the lectura Erfordi-
ensis, and vice versa. Where relevant, I will note these differences in the footnotes. For
Marsilius’ text, I use the following manuscript: MS. Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellonska,
709. Its reliability is established in: P. BAKKER, «Inhérence, univocité et séparabilité»,
pp. 215-216.
13. That this was a theologically delicate question can be learned from the condem-
nations of 1277. These contain four articles relating to the human capacity for knowing
God. These articles seem to leave philosophers after 1277 little space to develop their the-
ories on this subject. See D. PICHÉ, La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Nouvelle édition
du texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire, Paris 1999, articles n. 36: «Quod
deum in hac uita mortali possumus intelligere per essentiam»; n. 211: «Quod intellectus
noster per sua naturalia potest pertingere ad cognitionem essentiam primae causae. Hoc
male sonat et est error, si intelligatur de cognitione immediata»; n. 215: «Quod de deo
non potest cognosci nisi quia ipse est, siue ipsum esse»; and n. 216: «Quod deum esse
ens per se positiue non est intelligibile, sed priuatiue est ens per se». For the origins of these
condemned articles, see J.A. AERTSEN, «Von Gott kann man nichts erkennen, außer daß
er ist (Satz 215 der Pariser Verurteilung). Die Debatte über die (Un-)möglichkeit einer
Gotteserkenntnis quid est», in: J.A. AERTSEN – K. EMERY, Jr. – A. SPEER (eds.), Nach der
Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten
Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte, Berlin / New York 2001, pp. 22-37.
delicate character, this question lends itself well for a further com-
parison of Buridan’s and Marsilius’ commentaries on the Metaphysics13.
But before I explore the positions of Buridan and Marsilius, I shall
explain very briefly the origins of the present question.
2. The origins and development of the discussion
In the fourteenth century, the possibility of natural knowledge about
God’s essence was widely discussed, not only in theological writings,
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14. A very famous theological analysis of man’s natural capability of knowing God
can be found in JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, I, 3, 1, 1, in: Opera Omnia, III, ed.
C. BALIC, Vatican 1954, pp. 1-48.
15. For an extensive discussion of this passage see C. STEEL, Der Adler und die Nacht-
eule. Albert und Thomas über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik, Münster 2001.
16. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, II, 1, 993a30-993b11; transl. in: J. BARNES (ed.), The
Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton 1995, pp. 1569-
1570. In William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation, which was most probably used by Buri-
dan and Marsilius, the text reads: «De ueritate theoria sic quidem difficilis est, sic uero
facilis. Signum autem est neque digne nullum adipisci ipsam posse nec omnes exsortes esse
[…]. Forsan autem et difficultate secundum duos existente modos, non in rebus sed in
nobis est eius causa. Sicut enim nicticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et anime
nostre intellectus ad ea que sunt omnium nature manifestissima.» See Aristoteles Latinus,
XXV. 3, ed. G. VUILLEMIN-DIEM, p. 43, 1-14.
17. See ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, II, 1, 993b23-993b30. According to Carlos Steel, this
passage in fact discusses the question whether human beings have the capacity for know-
ing things that transcend sense perception. What is at stake, in other words, is the possi-
bility of the project of metaphysics, for the wish to perform a metaphysics might founder
on the fact that we are not capable of such knowledge. See C. STEEL, Der Adler und die
Nachteule, pp. 4-5.
18. Averroes explained that Aristotle’s words bespeak the difficulty, and not the impos-
sibility to know separate substances. For if it were impossible for us to understand abstract
things (res abstractae), nature would have acted in vain. It would have made something,
such as commentaries on the Sentences, but also in many purely philo-
sophical writings, like the commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics14.
The question on the knowability of God harked back to a single
remark in Aristotle’s Metaphysics on the knowability of the «things
which are by nature most evident of all»15. Aristotle stressed:
The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indi-
cation of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth ade-
quately, while, on the other hand, no one fails entirely […]. Perhaps, as dif-
ficulties are of two kinds, the cause of the present difficulty is not in the facts
but in us. For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in
our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all16.
According to Aristotle, the difficulty of knowing the most evident
things lies in us, and more specifically in our rational power. These
most evident things must be «the principles of eternal things», for
these are by nature most intelligible17. The tone of the medieval dis-
cussion that was provoked by this passage was set by Averroes and
focused on the question whether human beings, conjoined to their
bodies, have the capacity for knowing separate substances (substantiae
separatae)18. In a scholastic context this question was provided in
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which is in itself naturally intelligible, whereas it is not understood by something else; as
if nature made the sun invisible for any sight. See AVERROES, In Aristotelis librum II (a)
Metaphysicorum commentarius, ed. DARMS, Fribourg 1966, p. 55-56: «Sed hoc non demon-
strat res abstractas intelligere esse impossibile nobis, sicut inspicere solem est impossibile
vespertilioni, quia si ita esset, otiose egisset natura, quia fecit illud, quod est in se natu-
raliter intellectum, aliquando non intellectum ab aliquo, sicut si fecisset solem non com-
prehensum ab aliquo visu.» Before Averroes, there was already a long Greek tradition of
commentaries on this passage. See e.g. ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, In Metaph., II, 1, ed.
M. HAYDUCK, Berolini 1891, p. 142, 16-23. In this article, I do not further examine the
different medieval interpretations of Aristotle’s simile of the bat, for others have done that
before me. See STEEL, Der Adler und die Nachteule.
19. Carlos Steel calls this question «die scholastische Version der modernen Frage nach
der Möglichkeit der Metaphysik». See C. STEEL, Der Adler und die Nachteule, p. 4.
20. See L. STURLESE, Die deutsche Philosophie im Mittelalter. Von Bonifatius bis zu Albert
dem Großen (748-1280), München 1993, pp. 351-352.
21. See BURIDAN, QM, XII, 9, fol. 73ra: «Ideo sequitur secunda conclusio: quod preter
ipsum Deum non oportet ponere alias substantias separatas ad movendum corpora celes-
tia».
22. See BURIDAN, QM, XII, 9, fol. 73ra: «Alia etiam conclusio ponitur: quod sunt
multo plures substantie separate quam sphere celestes vel motus celestes, scilicet magne
legiones angelorum; sed ista probari non possunt rationibus demonstrativis, habentibus
ortum ex sensatis». The philosophical realm concerned demonstrative knowledge discovered
by a discursive process based on mere perception, as opposed to theology, which proceeds
from beliefs that are not known evidentially. See BURIDAN, QM, I, 2, fol. 4ra-4rb : «Notan-
dum est etiam quod hic non comparamus metaphysicam ad theologiam, que procedit ex
ignotis creditis quamvis non per se notis nec evidentissimis, […]. Sed nos in proposito non
commentaries on De Anima and the Metaphysics19. The question is
partly epistemological, as it explores the limits of philosophical knowl-
edge, but it is also metaphysical, for it examines our capacity for
knowing the supernatural, i.e. separate substances, including God.
In their commentaries on the Metaphysics, Buridan and Marsilius
exclusively considered our capacity for knowing the first cause or God,
and did not pay attention to separate substances. This can be
explained, considering Buridan’s views on separate substances. The
philosophical class of separate substances, opposed to the theological
class of angels, was usually bound to celestial movement20. But in the
twelfth book of the Metaphysics, Buridan argued that we do not need
any separate substance besides God himself for safeguarding celestial
movement21. Surely, he did not imply that separate substances do not
exist, for in the same question he defended the existence of many sep-
arate substances, i.e, many legions of angels. But Buridan adhered to
the common distinction between theology and philosophy, and he
excluded angels from the philosophical realm22. The existence of
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querimus nisi de habitibus intellectualibus ex humana ratione et processu ratiocinativo
inventis et ex nobis evidentibus deductis. […] Unde in hoc differt metaphysica a theolo-
gia, quod cum utraque consideret de Deo et de divinis, metaphysica non consideret de Deo
et de divinis nisi ea que possunt probari et ratione demonstrativa concludi seu induci».
23. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, fol. 10rb: «Notandum est quod ad istam facultatem non
pertinet inquirere quomodo post mortem intelligamus Deum, sed hoc pertinet ad the-
ologiam».
24. See footnote 11.
25. See MARSILIUS, QM, II, 3, fol. 16ra: «Secluditur a presenti investigatione cognitio
beatifica quam habent sancti in patria, quoniam illa homini non est possibilis in illa vita.
Secundo secluditur cognitio meritoria quam habent fideles per fidem et karitatem in vita
presenti, nam et hec in puro lumine naturali non est homini possibilis cum fides et kari-
tas sint virtutes infuse. Et sic manet sensus tituli: utrum aliquis in puro lumine naturali
possit habere cognitionem Dei seu prime cause». See also BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, fol. 10rb:
«Sed ad istam <facultatem> bene pertinet inquirere quomodo naturaliter in ista vita pos-
semus intelligere».
angels might be true according to Catholic faith, but this cannot be
proved demonstratively. Consequently, a philosophical question about
the knowability of separate substances exclusively concerns the first
cause, or God.
Buridan not only excluded angels from his exploration, he also
avoided the investigation of knowledge that we can acquire in the
afterlife, for that did not belong to «this faculty» (i.e., the Faculty of
Arts)23. He thus acted in accordance with the vow that arts masters
in Buridan’s day had to take: that they would dispute no purely the-
ological questions24. So, too, Marsilius of Inghen carefully distin-
guished the quest for philosophical knowledge of God from super-
natural knowledge, excluding the latter from his exploration.
Supernatural knowledge is the beatific knowledge that the blessed will
have in the afterlife, as well as knowledge that we have through faith,
for faith and grace are infused virtues. What remained was the ques-
tion whether we can have knowledge of God in a purely natural
light25. It is to this question I will now turn.
3. The intellect’s natural capacity for knowing God’s essence
3.1. Historical background: Thomas Aquinas and Antonius Andreae
To appreciate the significance of Buridan’s and Marsilius’ answers
to this question, one must consider its historical context. Buridan
and Marsilius, who argued that philosophical knowledge of God’s
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26. See THOMAS, Summa Theologiae (hereafter S. Th.), I, 84, 7, ed. Leon., V, Rome
1889, pp. 325-326; See also C. STEEL, Der Adler und die Nachteule, p. 9. For a full elab-
oration of Thomas’ view on (quidditative) knowledge of God see J.F. WIPPEL, Metaphysi-
cal Themes in Thomas Aquinas, Washington D.C. 1984, I, pp. 215-241; and ID., The Meta-
physical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite Being to Uncreated Being, Washington
D.C. 2000, pp. 501-575.
27. See THOMAS, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, II, 1, §285,
ed. M.-R. CATHALA – R.M. SPIAZZI, Taurini / Romae 1964, p. 82: «[…] impossibile est
quod anima humana huiusmodi corpori unita cognoscat de veritate rerum, nisi quantum
potest elevari per ea quae abstrahendo a phantasmatibus intelligit. Per haec autem nullo
modo potest elevari ad cognoscendum quidditates immaterialium substantiarum, quae
sunt improportionatae istis substantiis sensibilibus. Unde impossibile est quod anima
humana huiusmodi corpori unita, apprehendat substantias separatas cognoscendo de eis
quod quid est».
28. See THOMAS, S.Th., I, 12, 2, ed. Leon., IV, Rome 1888, p. 117: «Primo quidem
quia, sicut dicit Dionysius, primo capitulo De divinis nominibus, ‘per similitudines inferi-
oris ordinis rerum nullo modo superiora possunt cognosci’: sicut per speciem corporis
non potest cognosci essentia rei incorporeae. Multo igitur minus per speciem creatam
quamcumque potest essentia Dei videri». Thomas does not deny that we can be elevated
to knowledge of «insensible things» by means of sensible things, but this knowledge is not
essential. See C. STEEL, Der Adler und die Nachteule, p. 10.
29. Even Thomas’ master, Albert the Great, did not share his epistemologically pes-
simistic view. For an overview of Thomas’ first defenders and opponents, see C. STEEL,
Der Adler und die Nachteule, pp. 30-41.
essence is possible in this life, opposed directly to Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274). As is well known, Thomas Aquinas was convinced
that the essence of immaterial being cannot be demonstrated philo-
sophically, for conjoined to our earthly body, we can only gain
knowledge through abstraction from sensible things, by means of
phantasmata that we have from them26. Crucial to note is that
Thomas thinks it is impossible to proceed by abstraction from sen-
sible things to quidditative knowledge of immaterial substances, as
sensible and immaterial beings bear no proper relation to one
another27. As the essence of immaterial being cannot be abstracted
from the sensory images (species) of sensible things, God’s essence
(contrary to his existence) cannot be demonstrated from the sensi-
ble images of his effects28.
Even though Thomas’ position found many defenders in the late
thirteenth and fourteenth century, there was a greater tendency to
mitigate or contradict his views about the possibility of essential
knowledge about God29. An influential argument against Thomas’
position was found in the Quaestiones in Metaphysicam of Antonius
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30. For a list of manuscripts and editions of Andreae’s Quaestiones, see M. GENSLER,
«Catalogue of Works by or Ascribed to Antonius Andreae», in: Mediaevalia Philosophica
Polonorum 31 (1992), pp. 147-155, esp. 149-150, and C.H. LOHR, «Medieval Latin
Aristotle Commentaries. Authors A-F», in: Traditio 23 (1967), pp. 364-365. I use the
following edition: ANTONIUS ANDREAE, Questiones Antonii Andree super duodecim libros
Metaphysicae (hereafter QM), n.p. 1500, Bibliothèque nationale de France. For more infor-
mation about Andreae’s Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, see G. PINI, «Scotistic Aristotelian-
ism. Antonius Andreae’s Expositio and Quaestiones on the Metaphysics», in: L. SILEO, Via
Scoti: methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti, Rome 1995, II, pp. 375-389; G. PINI,
«Sulla fortuna delle Quaestiones super Metaphysicam di Duns Scoto: le Quaestiones super
Metaphysicam di Antonio Andrea», in: Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale
6 (1995), pp. 281-361; M. GENSLER, «Antonius Andreae, Scotism’s best supporting auc-
tor», in: Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia 8 (1996), pp. 57-79; ID., «Antonius
Andreae, Scotism’s best supporting auctor (II)», in: Anuari de la Societat Catalana de
Filosofia 9 (1997), pp. 39-50; and ID., Antonius’ Andreae’s Opus Magnum: the Metaphysics
Commentary, Serie tecnologiá filosófica, 18, Barcelona 1998.
31. See G. PINI, «Scotistic Aristotelianism», p. 381, and ID., «Le Quaestiones super Meta-
physicam di Antonio Andrea», p. 281. Although nowadays Scotus is the more famous philoso-
pher, I use Andreae’s Metaphysics commentary instead of Scotus’ works for this article. The
reason for that is twofold. First, I want to focus mainly on philosophical works. Scotus touches
only briefly on the question of God’s intelligibility in his commentary on the Metaphysics,
whereas he makes his famous claims as to the intelligibility of God mainly in his commen-
tary on the Sentences (See C. STEEL, Der Adler und die Nachteule, p. 40). Andreae on the other
hand explores the present subject thoroughly in his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, taking the
material for his investigation from Scotus’ Ordinatio. (See G. PINI, «Le Quaestiones super
Metaphysicam di Antonio Andrea», p. 333). Second, Andreae’s Quaestiones had an enormous
succes and are likely to have been a main channel of the spread of Scotus’ commentary on
the Metaphysics. Andreae’s commentary on the Metaphysics has come to us in no less than
44 manuscripts and 21 editions, an indication that it was widely used (See G. PINI, «Scotis-
tic Aristotelianism», p. 384, n. 33). It is therefore very likely that Buridan and Marsilius were
familiar with this text. For an investigation of the relation between Scotus’ and Andreae’s
commentaries on the Metaphysics see G. PINI, «Scotistic Aristotelianism», pp. 375-389, and
ID., «Le Quaestiones super Metaphysicam di Antonio Andrea», pp. 281-361.
32. These degrees of intellective knowledge were analagous to six degrees of sensitive
knowledge. See ANDREAE, QM, II, 3: «Similiter etiam correspondenter dicuntur sex gradus
cognitionis intellective». See also M. GENSLER, Antonius’ Andreae’s Opus Magnum, pp. 48-
49. The division in six degrees of sensitive and intellective knowledge is also found in
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, II, 3, 80-85, Opera
Andreae (ca. 1280 – ca. 1333)30. These questions were written
between 1316 and 1333 to function as a textbook in the philosoph-
ical studia of the Franciscan Order. They are looked upon as a revi-
sion of Scotus’ Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, interpreted in the light
of Scotus’ teaching as it can be found in his theological works31.
To answer the question as to whether essential knowledge of sepa-
rate substances, among them God, is possible, Andreae distinguished
six degrees of intellective knowledge (noticia)32. The first two degrees
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Philosophica, III, ed. R. ANDREWS et al., New York 1997, pp. 224-225. See also M.
GENSLER, Antonius’ Andreae’s Opus Magnum, pp. 39-50, esp. 48-49.
33. See ANDREAE, QM, II, 3: «Prima cognitio est intuitiva, que dicitur notitia visio-
nis que est de obiecto presenti, ut presens est in sua existentia. […] Exemplum primi: cog-
nitio beatorum in patria».
34. See ANDREAE, QM, II, 3: «Secunda cognitio est abstractiva, que est obiecti pre-
sentis in sua specie genita ab obiecto quod potest esse absens in sua existentia. […] Exem-
plum secundi: cum intelligo rosam absentem». For the origin of the distinction between
abstractive and intuitive cognition, see J.F. BOLER, «Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition»,
in: N. KRETZMANN – A. KENNY – J. PINBORG (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism,
1100-1600, Cambridge 1982, pp. 460-478; see also S.D. DUMONT, «Theology as a Sci-
ence and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition», in:
Speculum 64 (1989) pp. 579-599.
35. See ANDREAE, QM, II, 3: «Tertia est cognitio obiecti oppositi obiecto primi modi.
[…] Exemplum tertii: cum intelligo aliquid oppositum contrarie vel forte privative obiecto
intuitive viso, ut cum intelligo non visum obiectum intuitive».
36. See ANDREAE, QM, II, 3: «Quarta est cognitio obiecti oppositi obiecto secundi
modi. […] Exemplum quarti: cum intelligitur oppositum contrarie vel privative obiecto
abstractive cognitio, puta cum intelligo non-rosam abstractive cognitam».
37. See ANDREAE, QM, II, 3: «Quinta est cognitio alicuius ex conceptibus aggregatis.
[…] Exemplum quinti: cum intelligo aliquid esse ens infinitum necessarium sempiternum».
38. See ANDREAE, QM, II, 3: «Sexta est per accidens cum aliquid cognoscit per speciem
illius quod sibi accidit. Exemplum sexti: substantia intelligitur per speciem accidentis
secundum unam opinionem».
result from the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cogni-
tion. Intuitive cognition is knowledge of a thing insofar as it is pre-
sent in its own existence. An example is the knowledge of the blessed
in the afterlife33. Abstractive cognition is cognition of a thing which
is absent. An example is the knowledge of a rose, where that rose is
not present34. The third degree is cognition of some opposite or pri-
vation, by intuitive knowledge of a thing. Andreae does not provide
a specific example, but an example could be the knowledge of ‘no
light’, or darkness, by the intuitive knowledge of light35. The fourth
degree is, again, cognition of some opposite or privation, but in this
case by abstractive knowledge of a thing, as when I know ‘no rose’
based upon abstract knowledge of a rose36. The fifth degree is knowl-
edge through a compound concept (conceptus aggregatus), e.g., to know
that something is a ‘necessary sempiternal infinite being’37. The sixth
degree is accidental knowledge of a thing (per accidens), by virtue of
what results from it, for example a substance that is known by deduc-
tion from its accidents38.
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39. See ANDREAE, QM, II, 3: «Ad propositum dico quod quiditas substantiarum sep-
aratarum non intelligitur nec primo, nec secundo, nec tertio, nec quarto, sed quinto modo,
scilicet: in conceptu aggregato. Et aliqualiter sexto modo, scilicet: per effectus suos. Sub-
stantie enim separate cognoscuntur per hoc quod multa apprehensa simul concipiuntur,
que omnia nunquam alibi inveniuntur et nulli alii conveniunt. Et iste est conceptus aggre-
gatus, puta de Deo quod est ens infinitum, necessarium et primum, etc., que omnia nulli
conveniunt simul accepta nisi Deo. Et sic de aliis intelligentiis». Andreae’s position strongly
reflects that of John Duns Scotus, who famously argued that we can have a proper and
quidditative concept of God. Scotus explored the topic in the third distinction of the first
book of his Ordinatio, in which he argues against his main opponent, Henry of Ghent,
on the question whether we can know God naturally in our present state (ab intellectu via-
toris). For both Henry and Scotus the possibility of such knowledge was beyond dispute.
However, Scotus disagreed with Henry’s view that we could only know God in a univer-
sal way, according to general, analogous concepts, and argued that it is naturally possible,
i.e., without help from faith, revelation or divine illumination, to obtain univocal concepts
by which God is conceived not only generally, but also in himself and quidditatively. See
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio I, 3, 25-30, p. 16: «Dico ergo primo quod non tantum
haberi potest conceptus naturaliter in quo quasi per accidens concipitur Deus, puta in
aliquo attributo, sed etiam aliquis conceptus in quo per se et quiditative concipiatur Deus».
For Henry of Ghent’s position, see M. PICKAVÉ, Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste
Wissenschaft. Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhun-
derts, Leiden / Boston 2007, pp. 347-358.
Andreae argued that quidditative knowledge of separate substances
is not possible if by ‘knowledge’ we mean intuitive knowledge, for
this is only possible in the afterlife, when separate substances are
immediately present to us. It is also impossible to know them accord-
ing to the second, third and fourth degree of intellective knowledge,
for such knowledge either requires intelligible species, which we can-
not acquire of separate substances in this life, or an intelligible oppo-
site, which they do not have. But we can know them quidditatively
according to the fifth degree of intellective knowledge, through a com-
pound concept, and according to the sixth degree, through their
effects. An example of this is knowledge of God through a compound
concept that expresses that he is an infinite being, necessary and first39.
Andreae thus believed in the intellect’s capacity for knowing God’s
essence, mediated by concepts that could be abstracted from created
beings. Such knowledge could be obtained by proceeding from effect
to cause in a demonstration ‘quia’, according to the sixth degree of
intellective knowledge. Although many authors before claimed, against
Thomas, that the intellect conjoined to the body can know God’s
quiddity, it was Andreae’s semantic approach that anticipated Buridan’s
and Marsilius’ solution to the problem.
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40. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, fol. 10rb: «Et pono conclusionem communiter ab
omnibus concessam, quod ipsum Deum possumus intelligere [primo] et de ipso habere
scientiam demonstrativam, quia in duodecimo huius multe conclusiones demonstrantur
ubi termini supponunt pro ipso Deo. Et hoc est de ipso Deo habere scientiam demon-
strativam».
41. For a brief overview of Buridan’s semantic framework, see P.O. KING, «Jean Buri-
dan (b. ca. 1295/1300; d. after 1358)», in: J.J.E. GRACIA, Individuation in Scholasticism:
The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650, New York 1994, pp. 398-
399, and G. KLIMA, John Buridan, Oxford 2009, passim. See also P.V. SPADE, «Ockham’s
Distinction between Absolute and Connotative Terms», in: Vivarium 13 (1975), pp. 55-
76, esp. 56-57.
42. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, fol. 10va: «Et super hoc beatus Thomas ponit duas con-
clusiones. Prima est quod ipsum Deum intelligimus quantum ad si est, vel quia est, vel
quantum ad suum esse. Et ista conclusio bene conceditur ab omnibus». For Buridan there
is a distinction between knowledge quia est and knowledge si est. ‘Being’ (esse) can be taken
here as a copula (esse tertio adiacens) or as an existential predicate (esse secundo adiacens).
3.2. John Buridan
John Buridan was among those philosophers who favoured the posi-
tion according to which God’s quiddity can be known by means of
quidditative concepts. The development of his position is preceded by
the following passage, in which Buridan gives his view on the possi-
bility of achieving demonstrative knowledge of God:
I posit the following thesis, which is generally granted by everyone: that we
can understand God, and that we can have demonstrative knowledge of Him.
For many theses are demonstrated in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, the
terms of which stand for (supponunt) God. And this is what having demon-
strative knowledge of God is40.
In this passage, Buridan defines what having demonstrative knowledge
of something entails: it is nothing but demonstrating a thesis through
a syllogism in which the terms stand for the thing that must be
demonstrated. In Buridan’s semantics, as in William of Ockham’s,
these written or spoken terms correspond to mental equivalents, or
concepts41. Hence, according to this passage, we have concepts which
stand for God. Nevertheless, Buridan did not yet answer the question
of whether we can understand God quidditatively.
In order to answer this question, Buridan entered into a direct dis-
cussion with Thomas Aquinas and distinguished two steps in Thomas’
view: the first is that we can know God according to his quia est or
si est, or simply according to his mere being (suum esse), a view that
Buridan expects everyone to endorse42. The second is that we cannot
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These two kinds of being represent knowledge quia est and si est respectively. Buridan
pointed out that Aristotle often confused them. See BURIDAN, De demonstrationibus (here-
after SD), 8.3.3, ed. L.M. DE RIJK, Groningen / Haren 2001, p. 70: «Et est haec clausula
manifesta, si consideremus quod, licet Aristoteles et nos ad placitum vocaremus quaes-
tionem de esse secundo adiacente ‘quaestionem si est’ et illam de tertio adiacente ‘quaes-
tionem quia est’, tamen Aristoteles aliquando vocat utramque ‘si est’ et aliquando utramque
‘quia est’».
43. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, fol. 10va: «Alia conclusio est quod Deum non possumus
intelligere quantum ad eius quiditatem. Et istam conclusionem nititur sic probare: quia
non possumus Deum cognoscere nisi a posteriori cum non habeat causam priorem se. Sic
autem cognoscere non est cognoscere quid est aut propter quid est, immo solum si est vel
quia est, ut habetur secundo Posteriorum. Igitur, etc.». Cf. ARISTOTLE, An. Post., II, 1,
89b31-34; 2, 90a15.
44. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, fol. 10va: «Et iste sunt rationes beati Thome. Quibus non
obstantibus credo quod quiditatem Dei nos possumus intelligere et quod ipsum Deum nos
possumus quiditative intelligere».
45. Consequently, Buridan’s quaestio was about quidditative knowledge all along.
46. See BURIDAN, QM, IV, 8, fol. 18vb: «Et per essentiam in proposito intelligo ipsam
rem.[…] Et ego dico cum illo Linconiensi et Commentatore quod in unaquaque re est idem
illa res et eam esse, ita quod non differt essentia ab esse, nec esse ab essentia.» For an out-
line of Buridan’s view on being and essence, see J. BIARD, «La théorie de l’être et de l’essence
de Jean Buridan», in: M. PICKAVÉ (ed.), Die Logik des Transzendentalen: Festschrift für Jan
A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag, Berlin 2003, pp. 383-394. See also L. DE RIJK, «Introduc-
tion», in: Johannes Buridanus. Lectura Erfordiensis, pp. lv-lvii.
know God’s essence, since we can only know God a posteriori, i.e.,
through his effects43. This step is considered more problematic. As
I have shown, the fact that knowledge of God is never a priori or
intuitive did not keep Andreae from holding that we can acquire quid-
ditative concepts of God. Likewise, the a posteriori character of such
knowledge did not prevent Buridan from claiming that we can know
God’s quiddity44.
Buridan argued that God’s quiddity is nothing else than God him-
self, because in general a quiddity or essence is nothing but the thing
itself. Hence, to ask whether we can know God’s quiddity is simply
to ask whether we can know God45, and given that God is precisely
the same as his essence, it is impossible to know God and at the same
time not to know his essence. This opinion was founded on Buridan’s
view of the distinction between esse and essentia, according to which,
in each and every thing, being and essence really coincide, such that
essence does not differ from being and vice versa46. Although Thomas
also acknowledged the unity of being and essence in God, Buridan
claims that being and essence do not even differ rationally (secundum
93225_RTPM_10-1_05_Kok_AP  17-06-2010  20:47  Pagina 149
150 F.J. KOK
47. See BURIDAN, QM, IV, 9, fol. 19va: «Sed magis venio ad propositum et pono con-
clusionem quod esse meum et essentia mea non differunt secundum rationem, nec lapis
et esse eius, quia impossibile est quod idem differat a seipso, sive secundum rem, sive
secundum rationem, vel secundum quodlibet aliud». On the relationship between esse and
essentia in Thomas’ writings, see J. WIPPEL, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, I,
pp. 107-161.
48. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, fol. 10vb: «Si autem per quiditatem tu velles intelligere
predicata quiditativa, adhuc ego possem intelligere Deum quiditative. Quia aliquid intel-
ligere quiditative est ipsum intelligere secundum conceptum a quo sumitur predicatum quid-
itativum». For a detailed acount of Buridan’s theory on essential and accidental predicates,
see G. KLIMA, «The essentialist nominalism of John Buridan», in: The Review of Metaphysics
58 (2005), pp. 739-754, and A. TABARRONI, «Buridan and Marsilius on Accidental Terms».
49. See G. KLIMA, «The essentialist nominalism of John Buridan», p. 742; A. TABAR-
RONI, «Buridan and Marsilius on Accidental Terms», pp. 392-394, and BURIDAN, De Pre-
dicabilibus, SD, 2.1.3.
50. According to Ockham’s semantics, connotative terms not only signify primarily,
i.e., they do not only signify exactly that of which the term is truly predicable (at this
rationem)47. Therefore, God can be known by knowing his quia est,
and accordingly God’s essence is known, which is nothing but God
himself. In other words, knowledge of God’s quia est includes knowl-
edge of his essence.
More than Buridan’s view on the distinction between esse and essen-
tia, some features of his semantics are of great importance to the pre-
sent discussion. According to Buridan, one way to understand a thing
quidditatively is to understand it by means of a concept from which
a quidditative predicate term is derived48. In Buridan’s semantics, a
quidditative or essential predicate term, which corresponds to an
absolute concept, is a term that does not add some extraneous con-
notation to the subject term, i.e., it stands for nothing in addition to
what it is suppositing for in a proposition49. Perhaps an example can
illustrate this more vividly. In the proposition «Socrates is a man»,
‘man’ is an essential predicate, since it does not add something extra-
neous to Socrates, i.e., it does not say something about Socrates that
pertains to him in a non-essential way. But in the proposition
«Socrates is a redhead», ‘redhead’ is a non-essential predicate, which
corresponds to a connotative concept (in Buridan’s terminology, an
appellative concept); for although it stands for the same being
(Socrates), it connotes something in addition to it, i.e., Socrates’ red-
headedness. A term like ‘redhead’ is not an essential, but rather a con-
notative term, since it connotes something that is extraneous to that
thing for which it stands50.
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moment, or in the past or future, or even possibly), but they also signify something sec-
ondarily, i.e., something of which they cannot be truly predicated. For a further exploration
of this theory, see P.V. SPADE, «Ockham’s Distinctions between Absolute and Connotative
Terms», pp. 61-76; For Buridan’s doctrine of connotation, see L.M. DE RIJK, «On Buri-
dan’s Doctrine of Connotation», in: J. PINBORG (ed.), The Logic of John Buridan, Copen-
hagen 1976, pp. 91-100; A. MAIERÙ, «Significatio et Connotatio chez Buridan», in:
J. PINBORG, The Logic of John Buridan, pp. 101-114; and G. KLIMA, John Buridan, Oxford
2009, pp. 56-57.
51. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, 10vb: «Sed sic iam possem intelligere Deum, quia intel-
ligo et scio quod Deus est substantia, quod Deus est Deus, quod Deus est ens vel aliquid.
Et ista sunt predicata quiditativa, quia si ego scio quod Deus est Deus, scio quid Deus est,
quia Deus est Deus et non est aliud quam Deus». How we acquire such essential predi-
cate terms will become clear below.
52. See R. SCHÖNBERGER, Relation als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buri-
dan im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik, Leiden 1994, p. 303. Quia est is taken
according to its meaning as being as a copula (esse tertio adiacens), and not as an
absolute or existential predicate (esse secundo adiacens). This becomes clear from Buri-
dan’s examples: not «God is», but «God is God» and «God is a substance». See also foot-
note 42.
53. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, fol. 10vb: «Unde exponere volentes sanctum Thomam
dicunt quod ipse per notitiam quiditativam intendebat conceptum simplicem pro Deo
et pro nullo alio supponentem; et talem, ut dicunt, non possumus habere, quia non pos-
sumus ad notitiam eius devenire nisi per ista inferiora, circumloquendo eum per aliqua
Now, according to Buridan we have several essential predicate terms
for God, since we all know that God is a substance, that he is God
and that he is a being or a something. Buridan argues that if we know
that God is God, we also know what God is: God is God and noth-
ing else than God51. In other words, a quidditative predicate like ‘God’
or ‘being’ provides a propositional answer to the question «quid est
Deus?», i.e., the answer «Deus est Deus», or «Deus est ens», or «Deus
est substantia», or «Deus est aliquid». Essential predicates of God
thus bring us knowledge of his being «such and so» (quia est), and also
of his essence, for these are essential predicates, which denote nothing
extraneous to God. Hence, the knowledge of God’s quid est is included
in the knowledge of his quia est, by means of a quidditative concept52.
Subsequently, Buridan claimed that these quidditative concepts are
simple, which stood him in contrast to Thomas’ interpreters (exponere
volentes sactum Thomam), who argued that we cannot obtain such a
concept in our present state. They thought that the term ‘God’ is not
attributed according to a simple concept, but rather through a com-
plex one, for it is precisely equivalent to the expression ‘first being’,
or ‘the first cause of everything’ or similar expressions53. Buridan’s
93225_RTPM_10-1_05_Kok_AP  17-06-2010  20:47  Pagina 151
152 F.J. KOK
predicata secundum convenientiam vel disconvenientiam ad ista inferiora; et talis cir-
cumlocutio non est secundum conceptum simplicem. Unde dicunt quod hoc nomen
‘Deus’ non est impositum secundum conceptum simplicem, immo complexum, quia tan-
tum valet precise sicut hec oratio ‘primum ens’ vel ‘prima causa omnium’, aut aliqua talis
oratio». As regards Thomas’ interpreters, Buridan might have had in mind Henry of
Gent and William of Ockham, who denied the possibility of simple, essential predicates
of God. See J. BIARD, «God as first principle and metaphysics as a science» in: R. FRIED-
MAN – L. NIELSEN (eds.), The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal
Theory, 1400-1700, Dordrecht 2003, p. 90. The discussion and refutation of arguments
from Thomas’ interpreters that occurs here was missing from the earlier version of Buri-
dan’s Questions on the Metaphyisics; see L.M. DE RIJK, «Introduction», in: ID., Johannes
Buridanus. Lectura Erfordiensis, p. lv.
54. Buridan’s semantics did not allow him to argue differently, for essential predicates,
contrary to non-essential predicates, always correspond with absolute concepts, and
absolute concepts are always simple. See G. KLIMA, «The essentialist nominalism of John
Buridan», pp. 746-748.
55. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, 10vb: «Tamen quicquid sit de hoc, credo quod ista con-
clusio non sit demonstrata. Unde quamvis non possimus intelligere substantias nisi medi-
antibus accidentalibus sensibilibus, tamen intellectus potest substantiam abstrahere ab acci-
dentibus et cognoscere sive formare conceptum simplicem substantie. Et ita etiam
possemus dicere quod ex istis inferioribus ascendimus ad cognitionem Dei, et secundum
convenientiam vel disconvenientiam attribuimus ipsi diversa predicata et multa, tamen
concepts, on the other hand, were not concepts of which the aggre-
gate of the constituent parts denote God, but simple concepts, with-
out constituent parts, which nevertheless denote God, i.e., concepts
that stand for God absolutely and not in any way in relation to some-
thing else54. In this respect Buridan also stood against Andreae, who
only allowed compound concepts to supposit for God quidditatively.
To prove his point, Buridan had to explain how we can obtain a
simple and absolute concept of God a posteriori. He argued that we
can ascend to such a concept with the help of the intellect. The intel-
lect is able to bring about a simple concept of God, by which it under-
stands him in an absolute way and separately from everything else. To
clarify this, Buridan compared a simple concept of God with a sim-
ple concept of substance. This comparison was thought to be appro-
priate because knowledge of substance, like knowledge of God, is
always mediated (by sensible accidents). We can neither know God
nor substance immediately. Still, the intellect is able to know sub-
stance, and to form a simple concept of it, through abstraction. In the
same way the intellect can form a simple concept of God, and it is
through this simple concept that we can know God, even though this
knowledge is always mediated by his effects55.
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intellectus tandem potest elicere conceptum simplicem quo intelligit ipsum absolute et
separate ab aliis».
56. Buridan eleborated his view about simple substantial concepts in the fourth ques-
tion of the first book of his Questions on the Physics and in the sixth question of the first
book of his Questions on the soul. See BURIDAN, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aris-
totelis (hereafter: QP) I, 4; and BURIDAN, Quaestiones in De Anima (hereafter: QDA), I,
6; For the text of Buridan’s Physica secundum ultimam lecturam I use a still unpublished
edition by J. Thijssen. For the text of his De anima secundum ultimam lecturam I use an
edition by P. Bakker, forthcoming in: P. BAKKER, Accidentia magnam partem conferunt
ad cognoscendum quod quid est. La tradition des commentaires du De Anima d’Aristote
(XIIIe-XVIIe siècles). Textes et études. Gyula Klima gives a clear and concise interpretation
of Buridan’s vision of substantial concepts on the basis of his commentaries on the Physics
and De anima, in: G. KLIMA, «John Buridan on the Acquisition of Simple Substantial Con-
cepts», in: R.L. FRIEDMAN – S. EBBESEN (eds.), John Buridan and Beyond: Topics in the
Language Sciences, 1300-1700, Copenhagen 2004, pp. 17-32. See also G. KLIMA, «The
Essentialist Nominalism of John Buridan», pp. 739-754. Klima used an edition of
De anima secunda primam lecturam, which was attributed to Buridan, but is most proba-
bly unauthentic: BURIDAN, Le Traité de l’âme de Jean Buridan (de prima lectura), ed.
B. PATAR, Louvain-la-Neuve 1991. Cf. S. EBBESEN, «Le traité de l’âme de Jean Buridan
(de prima lectura)», in: Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review 33 (1994), pp. 758-761.
57. That we have substantial concepts, i.e., concepts that supposit for substances with-
out connoting their accidents, is evident, according to Buridan. An example is the con-
cept ‘man’. This concept, from which we take the substantial term ‘man’, supposits for the
substance man and for nothing else. If on the other hand it supposited for or connoted
something else, e.g., an accident or the composition of accident and substance, man would
not be a substance, which is apparently false. See BURIDAN, QP, I, 4 [ed. J. THIJSSEN],
fol. 6rb: «Secunda conclusio est quod de substantia habemus conceptum simplicem, quia
conceptus hominis, a quo sumitur iste terminus substantialis ‘homo’, est conceptus sub-
stantiae, si homo est substantia; et ille conceptus non supponit nisi pro substantia, quia
si supponeret pro accidente vel pro composito ex accidente et substantia, tunc non esset
verum quod homo est substantia, quia nec accidens est substantia nec compositum ex
substantia et accidente est substantia, sed praecise substantia est substantia. Et etiam ille
conceptus supponendo pro substantia non connotat aliquod accidens aliud ab ipsa sub-
stantia, quia tunc non esset de praedicamento substantiae, sed accidentis, sicut iste termi-
nus ‘albus’ vel ‘magnus’ vel ‘pater’ et cetera. Illi enim termini ita supponunt pro substan-
tia et non pro alio, sicut ille terminus ‘homo’, sed exeunt a praedicamento substantiae
propter connotationem».
Since Buridan compares the obtaining of a simple divine concept
with the obtaining of a simple substantial concept, one must exam-
ine how the intellect can form a simple substantial concept in order
to understand how the formation of a simple concept of God comes
about56. In his questions on the Physics, Buridan claims that every
complex substantial concept is a compound of several simple sub-
stantial concepts57. For suppose that such a complex concept consists
of three simple concepts: a, b and c. If a, b and c were accidental
concepts, then the complex concept would be a complex accidental
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58. See BURIDAN, QP, I, 4 [ed. J. THIJSSEN], fol. 5va-vb: «Item. Si conceptus substan-
tialis hominis sit complexus, ponatur quod hoc sit ex tribus simplicibus, scilicet a, b, c.
Tunc, si nullus conceptus substantiae est simplex, a non erit nisi conceptus accidentis, et
similiter nec b nec c. Igitur totum complexum ex eis non erit conceptus nisi accidentium
et non substantiae, cum totum nihil sit praeter partes. Sed hoc est absurdum, scilicet quod
conceptus substantialis hominis non sit nisi conceptus accidentium; igitur etcetera».
59. See G. KLIMA, «John Buridan on the Acquisition of Simple Substantial Concepts»,
p. 30; and BURIDAN, QDA, I, 6 [ed. P. BAKKER]: «Omnes concedunt quod noticie acci-
dentium multum faciunt ad habendum notitiam substantiarum. […] Sed modus per quem
hoc fiat est bene dubitabilis. Aliqui enim ponunt talem modum. Supponunt primo quod
intellectus ad intelligendum indiget moueri a phantasmate, et phantasia a sensu, et sensus
ab obiecto exteriori. Et est suppositio uera. Secundo supponunt quod sensus et phantasia
non sunt nisi accidentium. Vnde Commentator secundo huius dicit quod sensus non
apprehendit quiditates rerum. […] Sed michi uidetur quod secunda suppositio istorum
erat falsa, scilicet quod sensus et phantasia non apprehendunt substantias […]. Et credo
quod, cum accidens et subiectum sint unita, facilius est confuse simul cognoscere accidens
et subiectum quam accidens distincte a subiecto, uel e contra. […] Alius modus dicendi
est quod sensus, sicut dictum est, apprehendit confuse et simul substantiam et accidens;
intellectum autem habet naturam et potentiam abstrachendi ex ista confusione conceptus
proprios et distinctos, quorum uno concipit substantiam sine accidente et alio accidens sine
substantia».
concept instead of a complex substantial concept. Consequently, any
complex substantial concept must be composed of simple substantial
concepts58.
That said, the question remains as to how the intellect is able to
extract simple substantial concepts from accidents. Klima summarizes
Buridan’s thoughts on the acquisition of substantial concepts, which
he expressed in his De anima, in two principles. The first is the prin-
ciple of the activity of the intellect, viz. the fact that the intellect is
not just a passive receiver of sensory information, but also a cognitive
faculty actively processing this information. In other words, the intel-
lect extracts substantial contents that the senses could not extract from
the external objects. The second, strongly related to the first, is the
principle of the substantial content of sensory information, viz. the
fact that information received by the senses contains information not
only about the sensible qualities of the object, but also about its sub-
stance59. In order to allow the intellect to perform its active ‘extrac-
tion’ of substantial information, the sensory faculty must already con-
tain this information, i.e., information about the substance bearing
these qualities, besides information about its qualities. After all, the
intellect can only abstract information that is already available.
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60. See BURIDAN, QDA, I, 6 [ed. P. BAKKER]: «Tertius modus dicendi est quod res
cognoscitur et representatur per suam similitudinem; effectus autem gerit in se quamdam
cause similitudinem, ymo est quedam participata similitudo cause; ideo effectus potest
representare causam, et causa effectum, propter quod innatum est utrumque cognosci per
reliquum hoc quia est, illud propter quid est; substantia autem et accidentia habent se ad
inuicem sicut causa et effectus; sic ergo per accidentia cognoscuntur substantie, et per infe-
riora substantie separate et tandem Deus, et e converso» (italics are mine).
In the Metaphysics, Buridan’s comparison of obtaining a simple con-
cept of God with obtaining a simple substantial concept suggests that
quidditative concepts of finite perfections in the same way include
(by connotation) that which is abstracted from them: a concept of
God. Buridan confirms this in his Quaestiones in De anima. An acci-
dent bears the similitude of a substance, just as any effect bears the
similitude of its cause, such that an accident can represent its sub-
stance (and vice versa), just as an effect can represent its cause. Hence,
a substance is known from its accidents, just as a separate substance,
and ultimately God, is known from its effects60.
In summary, Buridan taught that concepts of God are simple and
absolute, just as substantial concepts are. But to obtain such a con-
cept, it must be abstracted by the intellect from God’s effects, just as
a substantial concept can be abstracted from accidents. The paral-
lelism of these processes that Buridan underlines in his questions both
on the Metaphysics and on the De anima entails that the principle of
the substantial content of sensory information also applies, mutatis
mutandis, to knowledge of God. Buridan’s abstraction theory thus
requires a principle of the causal (or divine) content of sensory infor-
mation, in order to abstract simple, absolute concepts of God. As
I will argue below, this is the most controversial part of Buridan’s the-
ory of the knowability of God’s essence. Marsilius of Inghen, one of
Buridan’s influential adherents, rejected precisely this part of Buri-
dan’s reasoning.
3.3. Marsilius of Inghen
As already stated, there is a great resemblance between Marsilius of
Inghen’s and Buridan’s questions on the Metaphysics. This is also true
of the quaestio whether knowledge of God is possible in this life, found
in the second book of Marsilius’ commentary on the Metaphysics. For
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61. See MARSILIUS, QM, II, 3, fol. 16rb-va: «Ad secundum articulum sciendum est
quod positio beati Thome in duobus videtur consistere. Prima sua propositio est quod pos-
sumus cognoscere Deum cognitione quia est. Patet quia cognitio quam habemus de ipso
est ab effectibus ad causam et non e contra, cum Dei nulla sit causa. Talis autem vocatur
cognitio quia est, primo Posteriorum. Secunda propositio eius est quod quiditatem Dei
cognoscere non possumus, quam probat multipliciter. Primo ratione precedenti, quia non
habemus cognitionem de Deo nisi ab effectu ad causam […].»
62. See MARSILIUS, QM, II, 3, fol. 15ra: «Et sic manet sensus tituli: utrum aliquis in
puro lumine naturali possit habere cognitionem Dei seu prime cause. Et tunc est conclu-
sio responsalis quod in puro lumine naturali etiam philosophus infidelis potest habere
cognitionem Dei».
63. See MARSILIUS, QM, II, 3, fol. 16va: «Et ideo pro completius intelligendo illa dis-
tinguendum est de quiditate Dei, quia vel beatus Thomas per ‘quiditatem Dei’ intelligit
rem que est quiditas Dei, vel conceptum quiditativum communem Deo et aliis, vel tertio
modo notitiam Dei a priori, vel quarto modo notitiam Dei conceptu quiditativo essen-
tiali et proprio. De quo nunc nichil dicam, sed gratia Dei duodecimo huius». All four
ways were also mentioned in Buridan’s commentary, although not as systematically.
example, Marsilius, like Buridan, departed from Thomas’ two propo-
sitions: that we can know God according to his quia est, and that
since we can only know him from his effects, we cannot know his
quiddity61. However, in spite of some striking similarities, Marsilius’
attitude concerning the separation between philosophical and theo-
logical knowledge forced him to distance himself from Buridan’s point
of view, as I will argue below.
Like Buridan, Marsilius answered the question of whether natural
knowledge of the first cause or God is possible affirmatively. He was
convinced of the fact that even a pagan philosopher (such as Aristo-
tle) could be granted such knowledge62. To decide whether this knowl-
edge is quidditative or not, Marsilius distinguished four ways in which
Thomas understood the notion ‘God’s quiddity’. According to the
first, God’s quiddity is the ‘thing’ that is God’s quiddity, according to
the second it is a quidditative concept of God common to God and
others, according to the third it is an a priori notion of God and
according to the fourth it is a notion of God through a quidditative,
essential and proper concept. Marsilius further indicated that he con-
siders only the first three ways in the second book of his Metaphysics,
postponing the fourth until the twelfth book63. I will follow the order
of his division here, by briefly summarizing Marsilius’ treatment of the
first three ways, before moving on to consider his remarks in the
twelfth book, which are more interesting for the purposes of this
paper.
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64. See MARSILIUS, QM, II, 3, fol. 16va: «Qua distinctione premissa sit prima conclusio
hec. Homo potest quiditatem Dei primis duobus modis cognoscere. Patet de primo, quia
Deum potest cognoscere per primam propositionem beati Thome; et ipse est sua quidi-
tas; igitur».
65. See MARSILIUS, QM, II, 3, fol. 16va: «Patet de secundo, quia homo potest
cognoscere Deum esse substantiam duodecimo huius; modo, substantia videtur esse pred-
icatum quiditativum commune Deo et aliis».
66. See MARSILIUS, QM, II, 3, fol. 16va: «Secunda conclusio. Homo non potest
cognoscere quiditatem Dei tertio modo. Patet per rationem beati Thome primam, cum Dei
nulla sit causa».
67. See MARSILIUS, QM, XII, 13, fols. 156rb-160rb: «Utrum in puro lumine naturali
possit esse evidens sive notum Deum esse». A «purely natural light» is defined by Mar-
silius in QM, XII, 13, fol. 157vb: «Ad primum est sciendum quod lumen naturale voco
notitiam veritatis surgentem ex per se notis, vel notis per experientiam, vel ex hiis duobus
simul; vel que est notitia alicuius talium, scilicet per se notorum principiorum probabil-
iorum quam suum oppositum. […] Vel dicitur quod lumen naturale dicitur notitia veri-
tatis ad quam homo potest devenire sine revelatione divina speciali». I would like to thank
Han Thomas Adriaenssen, Paul Bakker, Sander de Boer, Wouter Goris and Suzanne Met-
selaar, all participants of Lectura Mediaevalis, a seminar of young Dutch researchers in
medieval philosophy, for their useful comments on this particular quaestio.
68. See MARSILIUS, QM, XII, 13, fol. 157vb: «In questione primo respondetur ad que-
situm. Secundo videtur utrum possibile sit nobis in lumine naturali habere conceptus pro-
prios et absolutos Dei».
According to Marsilius, we are capable of knowing God according
to the first two modes. We can know him according to the first, for the
‘thing’ that is God’s quiddity is nothing but God himself, i.e., the thing
of which the essence is sought. According to Thomas’ first proposi-
tion, we know God’s quia est, and therefore we know God (and con-
sequently his quiddity)64. We can also acquire quidditative concepts of
God that are common to him and others. ‘Substance’ is such a con-
cept, for it is predicated of God and other substances alike65. Finally,
Marsilius denied that we can have a priori knowledge of God, given
that to know God a priori is to know him through a proper cause, and
that God does not have a cause66. So far, Buridan and Marsilius agreed.
In the twelfth book, Marsilius discussed whether God’s existence
(Deum esse) can be evident or known in a purely natural light67. The
second article of this quaestio is devoted to proper and absolute con-
cepts of God68. Earlier, Marsilius refined his distinction of proposi-
tional cognitions (notitia propositionalis) of God into complex and
incomplex ones, of which the former presuppose the latter. These cog-
nitions can be threefold: firstly common to God and others, like the
concept ‘substance’; secondly, proper to God but accidental, like ‘first
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69. See MARSILIUS, QM, XII, 13, fol. 157vb: «Secundo notandum quod de Deo potest
haberi notitia complexa propositionalis et etiam incomplexa. Complexa enim incomplexam
presupponit et potest esse triplex: quedam communis Deo et aliis, sicut conceptus ‘sub-
stantie’; alia propria Deo et accidentalis, ut esse ‘primum principium’, ‘ens independens’;
et tertia propria Deo essentialis et absoluta. Et de illa dicetur in secundo articulo». Why
Marsilius does not give an example of the third kind will become clear below.
70. See MARSILIUS, QM, XII, 13, fol. 158ra: «Tertia conclusio. In lumine naturali
facilis est nobis conceptus Dei proprius et connotativus. Patet, nam facilis est conceptus
dependentis; et ergo addita negatione supponit solum pro Deo, quia ipse solus est inde-
pendens. Item. Conceptus primi est facilis, et etiam conceptus substantie; et ergo combi-
nando illos terminos, scilicet dicendo ‘prima substantia’, ut hoc complexum soli Deo con-
venit. Item. Conceptus mobilis est facilis, adde negationem dicendo ‘immobilis’, et illud
predicatum soli Deo convenit, quia ipse solum est immutabilis et immobilis secundum ver-
itatem. Item. Conceptus ‘simplex’ secundum veritatem nulli convenit nisi Deo».
71. By «a natural concept of God», Marsilius indicated that these concepts denote their
significata naturally, or according to their specific properties. This reading is supported by
the following passage, which says that a concept receives its power of representation only
according to its specific properties, in the same way as magnets attract iron because of their
nature. See MARSILIUS, QM, XII, 13, fol. 158vb: «Ex hiis dicit illa opinio, quod concep-
tus habet vim representativam solum ratione sue proprietatis specifice sicut forte adamas
habet attrahere ferrum, quia est talis nature».
72. See MARSILIUS, QM, XII, 13, fol. 158va: «Ad secundum est advertendum quod sit
opinio antiqua, et aliqui moderni doctores solempnes tenent eam, quod in lumine naturali
principle’ and ‘independent being’; thirdly, proper to God and
absolute, of which he gives no example69. The first kind was already
discussed in the third question of the second book. In the twelfth
book, Marsilius also considered the second kind, the proper acciden-
tal concepts of God, which he also calls proper connotative concepts.
These are easy to obtain, for instance by adding a negation to a con-
cept that is proper to dependent things (like ‘immobile’, which is
obtained from ‘mobile’), or by combining such concepts (e.g. ‘first’
and ‘substance’), so that the complex term supposits solely for God
(‘first substance’). Finally they can be obtained by forming a concept
like ‘simple’, which is derived from created things, but truly (secun-
dum veritatem) only suits God70.
Ultimately, Marsilius argued, some philosophers adhere to the belief
that it is possible in a purely natural light to have a proper, natural
concept of God, which is essentially predicable of Him71. He attrib-
uted this opinio antiqua to Averroes and added that it was also held
by some important modern doctors (moderni doctores solempnes).
Althoug he did not ascribe it to some particular contemporary
philosopher72, it is clear that Buridan was one of the moderni doctores
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possit haberi conceptus proprius naturaliter Dei predicabilis essentialis. Et hec opinio sum-
itur a Commentatore secundo huius […]». The term moderni was usually used to refer to
contemporary thinkers and not, as was long thought, to a particular group of philosophers
or theologians, or to the followers of Ockham. After 1310, moderni was not only used to
refer to philosophers who were actually teaching at that moment, but also to earlier four-
teenth-century philosophers. E.g., at the end of the fourteenth century, Scotus was refered
to as antiquus, whereas Ockham was refered to as modernus. See M. HOENEN, Marsilius
of Inghen, p. 14; and W.J. COURTENAY, «The Reception of Ockham’s Thought in Four-
teenth-Century England» in: A. HUDSON – M. WILKS (eds.), From Ockham to Wyclif,
Oxford 1987, pp. 89-107.
73. See MARSILIUS, QM, XII, 13, fols. 158vb-159ra: «Hiis premissis, est prima conclusio
ad illud propositum: stat quod aliquis in lumine naturali puro habeat proprium conceptum
essentialem et simplicem Dei. Istud declarant sic: stat quod intellectus in lumine naturali
habeat rerum dependentium conceptus proprios, eo modo quo sunt veri et perfecti, etc.;
et ex illis potest habere conceptum proprium et essentialem Dei; igitur. Consequentia
tenet. Et maior patet, nam intellectus in lumine naturali de rebus potest scire quod sunt
bone, perfecte, iuste, per se existentes et sic de aliis predicatis, ut notum est. Minor patet
primo quod proprium, quia si quis habet conceptum de bono viro in rebus dependentibus
et alias perfectiones ipse invenit quod in nulla aliarum est aliquod illorum perfecte, sed in
quolibet imperfecte, ergo neccessario concludit quod sit unum aliud in quo illa sunt per-
fecte, scilicet: prima essentia, summa bonitas et prima veritas etc., quia omne imperfec-
tum habet aliquid eo perfectius. Illo concluso habet conceptus proprios Dei et inde sup-
ponentes pro Deo, sed sunt connotativi. Modo, intellectus videns illos conceptus connotativos
potest omnes connotationes sequestrare et abstrahere. Et tunc illis sequestratis et abstractis, illi
conceptus essentialiter supponunt pro Deo sine omni connotatione».
74. See MARSILIUS, QM, XII, 13, fol. 159ra: «Hiis premissis, contra eius opinionem
et conclusionem ponitur conclusio responsalis: in lumine pure naturali non est possibile
alicui conceptus proprius et essentialis Dei».
that Marsilius had in mind, for one of the first conclusions that Mar-
silius drew from this opinion was that of Buridan, i.e., that a proper
connotative concept of God, acquired from created things (God’s
effects), can be turned into a proper, absolute concept of God by the
intellect, which can withdraw or abstract from it all connotations,
such that a proper, essential concept of God remains73.
In denying the possibility of obtaining a proper, essential concept
of God in a purely natural light74, Marsilius argued, for instance,
against the possibility of stripping proper connotative concepts of their
connotations. First, he admitted that if a proper connotative concept
of God could be obtained in a purely natural light, then it would be
through the abstraction of all connotations from perfections that
partly extend to dependent things. However, he denied this possibil-
ity. The acts of knowledge (noticie) from which this concept is
abstracted are either of an infinite number themselves, or are just one
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75. See MARSILIUS, QM, XII, 13, fol. 159rb: «Quarto sic: si possit haberi conceptus
proprius et essentialis de Deo maxime in lumine naturali, esset per abstractionem conno-
tationum a perfectionibus partialiter inventarum in rebus dependentibus, ut dicit alia
opinio; sed ab illis non potest sumi, quia vel ille notitie a quibus abstraherentur essent infi-
nite in multitudine, et hoc non, cum intellectus naturaliter non potest infinita cognoscere,
vel est una sola talis notitia, et hoc etiam non, nam ab unico conceptu non plures pos-
sunt abstrahi quam includit vel inquantum in ipso est; modo, conceptus rei finite con-
ceptum proprium essentialem rei infinite nullo modo includit, cum ille conceptus in anima
tua, tam quoad suppositum quam quoad connotatum, limitate illud representat […]».
76. See MARSILIUS, Quaestiones super librum De Anima (hereafter QDA), I, 5 [ed.
P. BAKKER]: «[…] effectus naturalis gerit in se similitudinem sue cause, vel est met simil-
itudo sue cause; igitur si accidentia sunt effectus substantiarum, etiam gerunt similitudinem
cum sua causa, et sic ducunt nos in cognitionem substantiarum. […] Ratione sic quia
effectus habet esse a sua causa; et per consequens ducit nos in cognitionem sue cause»,
single act. Now, the former is impossible, since the human intellect
cannot know the infinite. But the latter is impossible too, for from a
single act of knowledge, or from a single concept, can only be
abstracted what is found in it. According to Marsilius, the concept of
a finite thing does not include a proper, essential concept of an infi-
nite thing in any way, for in a human soul it only represents the thing
for which it stands (or which it connotes) in a limited way75. Every
concept of a perfection in the human soul represents only finite things
and does not include the same perfections in an infinite way. Abstrac-
tion will, therefore, not result in a proper concept of God. Marsilius
thus precisely argued against what I earlier called Buridan’s principle
of the causal (or divine) content of sensory information. 
As was noted above, this principle was based on Buridan’s analogy
between the obtaining of a simple divine concept and that of a sim-
ple substantial concept. Just as an accident bears the similitude of a
substance, any effect bears the similitude of its cause, and just as an
accident can represent its substance, an effect can represent its cause.
If Marsilius indeed denied the principle of the causal content of sen-
sory information, one would expect him to object to this analogy.
However, Marsilius seems to defend the same opinion in his com-
mentary on De anima. There he argued that a substance is known by
its accidents, just as an effect is known by its cause, and that the intel-
lect is able to abstract a proper concept of substance from its acci-
dents, since a vague, singular concept (which is obtained from sensa-
tion) includes in a confused way a concept of both accident and
substance76. But unlike Buridan, Marsilius limited this analogy of
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and: «Respondetur quod est ratione naturalis similitudinis, nam conceptus talis acciden-
tis singularis vagus confuse includit in se simul conceptum substantie et accidentis. Quam
confusionem intellectus potest abstrahere, scilicet abstrahendo conceptum substantie a
conceptu accidentis». Cf. M.E. REINA, Hoc hic et nunc. Buridano, Marsilio di Inghen e la
conoscenza del singolare, Firenze 2002, pp. 288-299.
77. Cf. BURIDAN, QDA, I, 6: «sic ergo per accidentia cognoscuntur substantie, et per
inferiora substantie separate et tandem Deus, et e converso»; and MARSILIUS, QDA, I, 5
[ed. P. BAKKER]: «Exemplo patet, quia tu cognoscis manum per scripturam alicuius; et sic
ille effectus ducit te in cognitionem illius qui scripsit».
78. See MARSILIUS, QDA, I, 5 [ed. P. BAKKER]: «Sed si fiat questio de cognitione sub-
stantiarum separatarum, dicitur quod non est presentis negotii, sed spectat ad duodecimum
Metaphysice».
79. See MARSILIUS, QM, XII, 13, fol. 158rb: «Quinta conclusio: hec propositio ‘Deus
est’ quoad conceptum illum quem generat in mente hominis catholici est demonstrabilis
et probabilis in lumine naturali. Patet, nam illa propositio in mente catholici simplicis
hominis non plus significat quam ‘primum ens esse’ vel ‘ens independens esse’». An inter-
esting objection to this view is the question of what happens if someone ‘decodes’ the
concept of God wrongly, e.g., because he thinks, as Aristotle did, that God is the first
mover, who is not free by freedom of opposition (primus movens non liber libertate oppo-
sitionis). Should not we say then that all mental knowledge about God is impossible for
this person? After all, the proposition «God is the first principle» would be decoded by
this person as «the first mover who is not free by freedom of opposition is the first prin-
ciple», which is false. This objection is attributed by Marsilius to Hugolino of Orvieto.
Nevertheless, Marsilius dismissed the objection, arguing that it is possible to know one true
proposition about God in a purely philosophical light, and at the same time to know sev-
eral false ones. Aristotle for example knew that God is the highest good, the first cause
and the first mover, and yet he thought that God was not free by freedom of opposition.
This is a general defect of natural light compared to the light of faith. See MARSILIUS, QM,
XII, 13, fol. 158rb-va.
causes and substance to natural causation only. The examples of both
authors are telling: whereas Buridan argues that a substance is known
through its accidents, just as God is known through his effects, Mar-
silius claimed that a substance is known from its accidents, just as a
hand is known from its writing77. Moreover, in his commentary on
De anima, Marsilius referred his students to the twelfth book of the
Metaphysics for the question of how separate substances can be
known78.
According to Marsilius, a concept of God in the human soul could
only be a connotative concept, for although it bears the similitude of
its cause, it does not include God’s perfections in an infinite way. As a
consequence, he considered the concept ‘God’ to be an encoding of
proper, connotative concepts like ‘first being’ and ‘independent being’79.
Marsilius also brought up another argument that is of interest for us:
suppose that an essential, proper concept of God could be obtained,
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80. See MARSILIUS, QM, XII, 13, fol. 159ra: «Tertio arguitur sic: nulla est clarior noti-
tia incomplexa preter intuitivam quam essentialis et propria Dei; et ergo debet representare
Deum sicut est quantum ad essentiam eius, sicut et conceptus proprius et essentialis
hominis representat hominem sicut est secundum suam naturam; et ergo conceptus pro-
prius et essentialis Dei debet eum representare sicut est secundum suam naturam. Et ergo
representat Deum ut est trinus et unus, cum secundum suam naturam Deus sit trinus et
unus. Modo, ille conceptus nulli est possibilis in lumine naturali». Marsilius believed that
there are many things that need a supernatural light to be grasped, and God’s trinity surely
is one of these things. See M. HOENEN, Marsilius of Inghen, p. 18.
then it should represent God according to his essence or nature. In
other words, it should represent God exactly as he is according to his
nature, i.e., as three and one. But this is clearly impossible in a purely
natural light80. Without divine revelation, such a concept surely cannot
be obtained. Whereas Buridan argued that an absolute essential concept
of God is a concept not adding any extraneous connotations to God,
Marsilius thinks of a proper essential concept as a concept that grasps
God’s nature and essence completely. However, God’s essence contains
many things that cannot be known in a natural light.
From this, it seems as if the disagreement between Buridan and
Marsilius stems from different conceptions of God. Whereas Buri-
dan’s conception of God was strictly philosophical, and separated from
all theological properties, Marsilius’ conception of God was mainly
theological, and contained theological properties such as God’s trin-
ity. Consequently, this could not be grasped in a purely natural light,
unlike Buridan’s more philosophical conception. Thus, even though
both arts masters kept the disciplines of metaphysics and theology
strictly separated, Buridan was far more optimistic about the possi-
bility of obtaining knowledge of God within a philosophical realm.
4. Buridan on knowledge propter quid of God
Buridan’s philosophical optimism is strengthened by the fact that he
seems to argue in favour of the possibility of knowing God’s quiddity
propter quid, as I will show below. If true, this point of view was
unique, for a demonstration propter quid about God was generally
regarded as impossible. Since a demonstration propter quid is a demon-
stration per causam, and God is uncaused, knowledge propter quid of
God was simply ruled out. Concerning the meaning of the concept
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81. See BURIDAN, SD, 8.3.2, p. 63: «Vel quaerit de quiditate causae rei expressae in
quaestione, et hanc vocamus ‘quaestionem propter quid est’, ut si quaero ‘propter quid
homo est?’ vel ‘propter quid homo est risibilis?’, ego non quaero quid homo est vel quid
est hominem esse risibilem, sed quaero quae sit causa essendi hominem vel essendi
hominem risibilem».
82. See BURIDAN, SD, 8.3.3, p. 71: «Et Aristoteles etiam ad eius manifestationem
ponit illam propositionem ‘in omnibus enim his manifestum est quod idem sit «quod
quid est» et «propter quid est’ et hoc est dictu quod omnis definitio causalis significat
causam propter quam est quod significatur per definitum». See also Marsilius of Inghen,
who argued similarly in: MARSILIUS, QM, II, 3, fol. 16va: «[…] cum idem sit quid et
propter quid secundo Posteriorum». Cf. ARISTOTELES, An. Post., II, 2, 90a14-15.
83. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, fol. 10vb: «Sed utrum habeamus de Deo scientiam
propter quid. Dicendum est indubitanter quod non de ipso sic habemus propter quid, cum
hoc sit per notitiam alicuius cause Dei, quia causam non habet. Sed sicut in mathemati-
cis sunt demonstrationes propter quid, ita et de Deo». The Lectura Erfordiensis lacks this
passage. It reads instead: «Et quando dicitur quod notitia a posteriori non sit nisi si est vel
quia est, dico quod verum est de notitia demonstrativa, quia notitia quiditativa non est de
necessitate notitia demonstrativa, unde quid est scitur non per demonstrationem, sed per
diffinitionem» (in: Johannes Buridanus. Lectura Erfordiensis, ed. L.M. DE RIJK, p. 49).
of propter quid, Buridan granted that a demonstration properly called
propter quid asks about the cause of the thing in question, i.e., it is a
demonstration answering the question for what reason a thing is81. On
the other hand, he more than once highlighted the fact that quid est
and propter quid est are actually the same82. From this point of view,
it may not come as a surprise that Buridan rescued the possibility of
a demonstration propter quid of God, in spite of his uncaused nature.
After all, Buridan also acknowledged the possibility of knowing God’s
quiddity, as I noted above.
In order to defend the possibility of a demonstration propter quid
of God, Buridan had to make a reasonable case for the possibility of
a demonstration propter quid, while lacking a proper cause. For this
purpose he used an analogy of mathematical demonstrations: just as
there are demonstrations propter quid in mathematics, so too we can
have knowledge propter quid of God83. For example, one could
demonstrate by means of a propter quid demonstration that «a tri-
angle has three angles equal to two right angles, because the exterior
angle equals its two opposite angles», without accepting any real cause
in this demonstration. Neither the triangle itself nor its exterior angle
can count as such a cause, for given that if it (i.e., the exterior angle)
had been annihilated, a triangle would still have three angles equal to
two right angles, because the exterior angle equals the two opposite
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84. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, fol. 10vb: «Si ego demonstro quod triangulus habet tres
angulos equales duobus rectis, propter hoc quod angulus extrinsecus equivalet duobus intrin-
secis sibi oppositis, sine dubio, ego non demonstro propter quid per causam trianguli nec
per causam angulorum suorum, quia iste angulus extrinsecus non est causa talium. Dato
enim quod esset annihilatus, adhuc triangulus haberet tres angulos equales duobus rectis».
85. In mathematics, perfect knowledge of a conclusion depends on whether the knowl-
edge is obtained by demonstrations, where conclusions are drawn in an evident manner
from evident premisses, i.e., perfect knowledge of a mathematical conclusion can be had
per modum conclusionis, without any knowledge of the cause of a triangle. See J. THIJSSEN,
«Buridan on mathematics», in: Vivarium 23 (1985), p. 59.
86. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 3, fol. 10vb: «Unde ex parte rei in mathematicis non est causa
et causatum, sed ibi solum causalitas attenditur penes conceptus priores, simpliciores et
notiores. Et ita de Deo sunt demonstrationes propter quid, ut in duodecimo Metaphysice».
87. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 1, fol. 9rb: «Similiter causa scitur per effectum quantum ad
quia est, quia effectus gerit quandam similitudinem cause. Ideo potest causam representare
una cum naturali inclinatione intellectus ad veritatem». According to this passage, an effect
is a sign of its cause in that it bears a similarity to it.
88. See BURIDAN, SD, 8.7.10, pp. 163-164: «De distinctione «propter quid» et «quia»»,
and 8.8.6, pp. 180-184: «De Demonstrationibus Mathematicis». All the English translations
are from G. KLIMA in: JOHN BURIDAN, Summulae de Dialectica, New Haven, London 2001.
angles84. The fact is that we cannot accept a real cause in a mathe-
matical demonstration, for there are no such causes ex parte rei in
mathematics85. That is because mathematical truths do not need real
mathematical objects in order to be true. Consequently, causality in
mathematics only extends to concepts. Concepts that are prior, sim-
pler and better known substitute for real causes in these demonstra-
tions. In exactly the same way there are demonstrations propter quid
about God: through prior, simpler and better known concepts86.
Unfortunately, Buridan’s reasoning results in a contradiction. For in
the first quaestio of the second book of his questions on the Meta-
physics, he maintained that a cause, when it is known through its
effects, is known only according to its being (quia est)87. Keeping this
is mind, if God is known only according to his effects, as Buridan
admits, this knowledge cannot be propter quid according to his rea-
soning. In order to understand Buridan’s remarks in the Metaphysics,
one must look closer at his concept of propter quid found in other
texts, to begin with, his Summulae de Dialectia.
4.1. Demonstrations propter quid in mathematics
Buridan distinguished two kinds of demonstrations: propter quid and
quia88. Since every demonstration that is not properly called propter
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89. See BURIDAN SD, 8.7.10, p. 163, 24: «Demonstrationem autem ‘propter quid’ voco
satis stricte illam quae facit scire conclusionem propter quid ita est, etiam appropriate, et illam
oportet esse per causam propriam». According to an earlier passage in De Demonstrationibus,
the esse in the question «because of what reason a thing is» can be interpreted as esse secundo
adiacens (an existential or absolute predicate) or as esse tertio adiacens (a copula), for someone
can demonstrate because of what reason a duck is and because of what reason it is quacking.
In the first case, it is asked because of what reason a duck is absolutely (simpliciter), and in the
second case, only with a qualification (secundum quid), i.e., as regards its quacking. Buridan con-
sidered both to be demonstrations propter quid. See BURIDAN, SD, 8.3.3, p. 70, 25: «[…]
notandum est quod cum dico ‘causam essendi’, possum intelligere dupliciter: aut simpliciter aut
secundum quid. Per «esse simpliciter» intelligo ‘esse secundo adiacens’ in propositione, et per
‘esse secundum quid’ intelligo ‘esse tertio adiacens’. Cum ergo quaero propter quid homo est,
quaero causam essendi hominem simpliciter. Sed cum quaero propter quid homo est risibilis,
ego non quaero causam essendi hominem simplicter, sed causam essendi ipsum risibilem».
90. See BURIDAN, SD, 8.3.3, p. 71, 5: «Sed cum dicitur in minori quod ista causa est
medium dicens quid est homo, sic intelligo quod, sic large loquendo, vocamus ‘defini-
tionem dicentem quid est’ non solum definitionem pure quiditativam, sed etiam defini-
tionem causalem. Et omnis causa quae quaeritur in demonstratione propter quid pertinere
potest, et debet, ad definitionem causalem illius de quo quaeritur; quae quidem definitio
causalis est conveniens medium in demonstratione propter quid».
91. See BURIDAN, SD, 8.2.5, p. 52, 16-19: «Prima est descriptione definitionis causalis.
Solet autem prima pars definitionis causalis poni in recto et esse genus vel subiectum
quid is a demonstration quia, Buridan thought it necessary to define
only the demonstration propter quid. To be propter quid a demonstra-
tion has to meet two requirements: first, it has to provide knowledge
of the conclusion because of what a thing is, and second, it has to pro-
vide this knowledge by means of the thing’s proper cause89. Such a
cause is a middle term saying what a thing is (medium dicens quid est),
provided that this is understood in a broad sense, i.e., not as a purely
quidditative definition, but as a causal definition. Every cause that is
sought in a demonstration propter quid must pertain to the causal def-
inition of the thing concerned, and therefore the causal definition is
an appropriate middle term in a demonstration propter quid90.
This can be more easily explained by means of an example. In a
demonstration propter quid about man, the middle term is not a
strictly quidditative definition of ‘man’, which indicates what the thing
is, like «man is a rational animal»; rather it is a causal definition,
which adds a causal term (in an oblique case) determining the essen-
tial predicate. An example of such a causal term is «having a rational
soul» in the definition «man is an animal having a rational soul».
This is a causal definition since it indicates the formal cause of «being
a rational animal», i.e., the possession of a rational soul91.
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termini definiti, ut indicet aliquo modo quid est esse rei, et subsequuntur termini causales
in obliquo, determinantes communitatem primae partis, donec definitio reddatur con-
vertibilis cum definito».
92. See J. BIARD, «John Buridan and the Mathematical Demonstration», in: V. HIR-
VONEN – T.J. HOLOPAINEN – M. TUOMINEN (eds.), Mind and Modality. Studies in the His-
tory of Philosophy in Honour of Simo Knuuttila, Leiden 2006, pp. 198-215.
93. It was a common idea that mathematical demonstrations only proceed by the for-
mal cause. See J. BIARD, «John Buridan and the Mathematical Demonstration», p. 206.
See BURIDAN, SD, 8.8.6, p. 180, 8: «Et iuxta praedicta ab Aristotele de mathematicis
dubitatur utrum ut in plurimum demonstrationes mathematicae debeant dici ‘propter
quid’ et per causam formalem, sicut dici consuetum est. Et videtur esse dicendum quod
si hoc teneatur, oportet minus proprie accipere ‘demonstrationem propter quid’ et minus
proprie etiam accipere ‘causam formalem’».
94. See BURIDAN, SD, 8.8.6, p. 180, 15: «Et apparet quod Aristoteles et alii commu-
niter dicunt quod sic. Tamen videtur mihi quod hoc non est, proprie loquendo, quia, licet
in eis scientia praemissarum sit bene causa scientiae conclusionis, tamen dictum fuit quod
hoc non sufficit, quia nec hoc distinguit inter demonstrationem ‘quia’ et demonstrationem
‘propter quid’». See also BURIDAN, SD, 8.8.6, p.181, 19: «Similiter, si demonstro quod
omnis triangulus habet tres angulos intrinsecos aequales duobus rectis per hoc quod unus
angulus extrinsecus est aequalis duobus angulis intrinsecis sibi oppositis, non est ibi causa-
litas ex parte rerum, quoniam angulus extrinsecus nullam habet causalitatem super istum
triangulum, nec super angulos eius intrinsecos, nec super aequalitatem eorum ad duos
rectos, quia nihilominus haec omnia essent, destructo illo angulo et omni magnitudine
extrinseca illi triangulo annihilata».
Buridan also raised the question whether mathematical demon-
strations should be called propter quid92. He argued that if this is
the case, then one should understand both propter quid and ‘formal
cause’ less strictly93. One of Buridan’s examples of mathematical
demonstrations propter quid in the Summulae is the same one that
we have seen already in the Metaphysics: every triangle has three
interior angles equal to two right angles, because the external angle
equals the two internal angles opposite to it. According to Buridan,
Aristotle, among others, called these kinds of mathematical demon-
strations propter quid; and to a certain extent he agrees with him.
However, Buridan underlines that we do not call this a demon-
stration propter quid properly speaking (proprie loquendo), for
despite the fact that in this demonstration knowledge of the
premises is definitely the cause of our knowledge of the conclu-
sion, this is not enough to distinguish it from a demonstration
quia94. In order to be properly called propter quid, not only must
the knowledge of the premises be the cause of the knowledge of
the conclusion. In addition, the causal term in the premises must
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95. See J. BIARD, «John Buridan and the Mathematical Demonstration», p. 202.
96. See BURIDAN, SD, 8.8.6, pp. 182-183: «In quibus autem scientiis cum hac prio-
ritate et causalitate consideratur differentia et prioritas causae ad causatum ex parte rerum
significatarum, demonstrationes non dicuntur ‘propter quid’ nisi procedant utroque modo
ex prioribus et causis ad posteriora et causata. Sed in quibus, scilicet in mathematicis,
omnino non observatur aliqua differentia vel prioritas causae ad causatum ex parte rerum
significatarum, demonstrationes solent vocari ‘propter quid’ ex illa sola prioritate et causa-
litate quae est praemissarum ad conclusionem secundum suum scire». See also J. BIARD,
«John Buridan and the Mathematical Demonstration», p. 205.
97. See J. BIARD, «John Buridan and the Mathematical Demonstration», p. 213.
98. Sten Ebbesen points out that Buridan is very consistent in his doctrine. What he
says about one subject is usually consistent with what he says about any related subject.
See S. EBBESEN, «Proof and its Limits According to Buridan», in: Z. KALUZA – P. VIG-
NAUX (eds.), Preuve et raisons à l’Université de Paris. Logique, ontologie et théologie au XIVe siè-
cle, Paris 1984, pp. 97-110, esp. 97. The argument regarding demonstrations propter quid
in mathematics is also found in the first book of the questions on the Physics. See Buri-
dan, QP, I, 4 [ed. J. THIJSSEN]: «Et vocamus demonstrationem propter quid quae pro-
cedit ex propositionibus naturaliter evidentioribus et magis scitis ad propositiones demon-
strabiles et innatas sciri per illas magis scitas. Et sic est in mathematicis».
signify the cause of the things’ being95. However, this is impos-
sible in mathematics, where there are no real causes, as Buridan
explained.
Even though, in order to be properly called propter quid, the causal
term in the premises must signify the cause of the things’ being, this
only applies to sciences in which the cause is different from that which
is caused. Yet in mathematics, there is no true distinction between the
cause and what is caused. Consequently, it is only the priority of the
knowledge of the premises over the knowledge of the conclusion that
leads to the speaking about demonstration propter quid96. The same
can be said about demonstrations of God, for what mathematical
demonstrations have in common with demonstrations about God, is
the fact that natural causality is inappropriate to them97.
4.2. Mathematics and God: a comparison
The similarity between Buridan’s discussion of demonstrations propter
quid in De demonstrationibus and his remarks in the Metaphysics are
striking98. Let us examine whether the discussion in De demonstra-
tionibus sheds some light on Buridan’s remarks in his questions on
the Metaphysics. To put it succinctly, Buridan argued that mathemat-
ical demonstrations are usually called propter quid, although not
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99. See BURIDAN, QM, II, 1. See also footnote 87.
100. See BURIDAN, SD, 8.8.6, p. 184, 8-12.: «Sed propter opinionem Platonis ponen-
tis praedicata quiditativa significare primo formas separatas, quas dicebat esse quiditates
substantiarum singularium, transsumptum fuit nomen ‘formae’ ad significandum praedi-
cata quiditativa. Sic enim dicit Aristoteles, secundo Physicorum et septimo Metaphysicae,
quod partes definitionis, quae sunt genus et differentia, sunt formae». Cf. ARISTOTLE,
Phys., II, 3, 194b26-29; Metaph., VII, 11, 1036a27-29.
101. See J. BIARD, «John Buridan and the Mathematical Demonstration», p. 209.
102. See BURIDAN, SD, 8.8.6, p. 184, 12-25: «Et ulterius elargita fuit haec
transsumptio, scilicet ad significandum omnes terminos definitionum, quicumque sint
illi, nisi manifeste termini definitionis et terminus definitus significent differenter causas
properly speaking. When Buridan used the phrasing «just as there
exist demonstrations propter quid in mathematics, so also of God» he
probably meant to say «not properly speaking» (improprie loquendo).
This would explain why Buridan seems to say the opposite in the first
quaestio of the second book of Metaphysics, at which point he writes
that we can only know a cause through its effect to the extent that it
exists, i.e., quia est99. Since Buridan admitted that we can only know
God through his effects, it would follow that we can only know him
to the extent that he exists in a demonstration quia. Nevertheless, not
properly speaking, we can also know him propter quid, for in order to
make a demonstration propter quid about God, as in mathematics,
one is able to use concepts that are prior, simpler and better known
to us, although they are not prior, simpler and better known in them-
selves.
It remains unclear, however, just how these concepts can function
as ‘causes’ in a demonstration propter quid. There is one passage in De
demonstrationibus that might help elucidate this. In this passage, Buri-
dan argued that quidditative predicates, or terms in a definition, can
function as formal causes in mathematical demonstrations. Referring
to Plato and Aristotle, Buridan gave the term ‘form’ a slightly differ-
ent signification, viz. that of quidditative predicates or definitions100.
Since a form in a strict sense is a cause, a quidditative predicate can
be considered a cause. Therefore, it is appropriate to say that math-
ematical demonstrations proceed from formal causes, since the main
tools of mathematicians are definitions101. Interestingly, Buridan
added that it is not only mathematicians that use these peculiar ‘for-
mal causes’, for the same occurs in other sciences in which attributes
are demonstrated of their subjects by means of their definitions102.
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et causata. Et quia omnes definitiones mathematicae sunt huiusmodi, ideo omnes defi-
nitiones mathematicas dicimus esse per formam vel per formas. Et quia forma proprie
dicta est causa, ideo adhuc remotiori intentione solemus dicere quod omnes illae defi-
nitiones mathematicae sunt datae per causas formales. Et sic ultimate, quia mathematicus
demonstrat per illas definitiones et reducit in eas, nos dicimus quod ipse demonstrat per
causas formales. Immo sic non solum in mathematicis sed etiam in multis aliis scientiis
in quibus demonstrantur passiones de suis subiectis per definitiones earum vel eorum,
si termini non significent differenter causas et causata, Aristoteles omnes demonstra-
tiones tales solet vocare ‘per causas formales’ et omnes definitiones quiditativas ‘defini-
tiones formales’».
103. See BURIDAN, SD, 8.7.10, p. 164, 17: «Sed quia nominibus possumus uti ad
placitum, transeat quod istam solam vocemus ‘propter quid’ quae est per causam pro-
priam».
104. See MARSILIUS, QM, II, 3, fol. 16va: «[…] cum idem sit quid et propter quid
secundo Posteriorum». Cf. ARISTOTLE, An. Post., II, 2, 90a15.
This reference to other sciences might include demonstrations propter
quid of God in metaphysics, since demonstrations about God proceed
from quidditative predicates, as Buridan explained.
In order to accept quidditative concepts as causes in a demonstration
propter quid, Buridan was forced to alter his understanding of a demon-
stration propter quid such that it became only a stronger version of a
demonstration quia. Consequently, the notion of a demonstration
propter quid was robbed of its strength, and, predictably, its importance
was weakened. Buridan himself was unconcerned with this, for the name
propter quid is used by convention, as he explained in De demonstra-
tionibus103. His approach could not have been successful without his
logico-semantical approach to science in general and to metaphysics in
particular. Buridan and his contemporaries shifted their attention to
concepts and propositions as the main objects of scientific knowledge.
They focused on propositional features like concepts instead of real
things. It was this approach that allowed Buridan to replace the real
cause in a demonstration of the reasoned fact with a proper, essential
predicate.
Unfortunately, Marsilius did not react to Buridan’s exploration of
the demonstration propter quid about God, besides a single remark in
one of the rationes; saying that quid est and propter quid est are prac-
tically the same according to the Posterior Analytics104. Whether he
thought that Buridan’s answer was superficial or even inappropriate,
or whether his silence on this issue actually implies an acceptance of
Buridan’s view, will remain a matter of speculation.
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5. Conclusion
John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen answered the question of
whether the intellect has a natural capacity for knowing God’s essence
affirmatively, and thus joined the multitude of philosophers who mit-
igated Thomas Aquinas’ opinion, according to which the intellect, in
its present state, lacks this capacity. Buridan argued that we can
acquire natural knowledge about God’s quiddity through an absolute,
quidditative concept of God. At first sight, his solution might seem
radical. Yet, Buridan is very clear about the fact that we can know
God’s essence only by his effects (per effectum) and not by his essence
(per quidditatem), which is a very traditional view. More remarkable
is his conclusion that quidditative knowledge of God can be acquired
through a demonstration propter quid, for this was usually taken as a
demonstration by the cause. It must be noted, however, that Buridan’s
use of the demonstration propter quid eroded the notion and impor-
tance of such a demonstration, for it could not be properly distin-
guished anymore from a demonstration quia. Buridan did not con-
sider this problematic, as the term propter quid is used by convention.
Unfortunately, Marsilius did not respond to Buridan’s remarks on
demonstrations propter quid of God in any way. On the other hand,
he did respond to his views on the intellect’s capacity for knowing
God’s quiddity. Marsilius followed Buridan to a large extent, but he
rejected one of his key arguments, viz. that our intellect is able to
abstract simple, absolute, quidditative concepts of God. According to
Marsilius, such concepts could only be connotative. To strengthen his
opinion, he points to the limits of what philosophy is able to. Since
absolute, quidditative concepts of God would reflect God’s complete
nature, including his trinity, they cannot be grasped in a natural light.
Marsilius did not return to a Thomistic reasoning, which blocked the
way to knowledge of God’s quiddity completely, but he restricted the
capacity of the human intellect for acquiring a concept that stands for
God and God alone, without connotation.
Again, we came across an interesting doctrinal contrast between
John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen in their commentaries on the
Metaphysics. Was their disagreement once again caused by different
perspectives on the role of theology in metaphysics? It seems not, since
both masters separated strictly between the natural and supernatural
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order. Still, Marsilius must have been afraid that Buridan’s point of
view loosened this separation. The disagreement rooted in their vari-
ous conceptions of God, viz. Buridan’s strictly philosophical concep-
tion vis-à-vis Marsilius’ more theological conception. Buridan, using
a strictly philosophical conception of God, could claim without dif-
ficulties that the intellect is naturally capable of grasping God’s essence,
for an absolute, essential concept of God is nothing but a concept
that does not add any extraneous connotations to God. Marsilius on
the other hand thought that such a concept must grasp God’s nature
and essence completely. Consequently, he had to deny that meta-
physicians could form such a concept, in order not to imply that our
natural knowledge includes doctrines of revelation, like God’s trinity.
As a consequence, the theologian Marsilius was forced to temper the
philosopher Buridan regarding his optimism about the intellect’s nat-
ural capability of grasping God’s essence.
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